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1.  Introduction 
“You shall not bear false witness against your neighbor.” (Exodus, 20: 16). A lie violates 
this commandment and similar social norms and might therefore offend others. Apart from being 
dishonest, lying can also be harmful if the liar exploits her private information at the expense of 
an uninformed person. Even if the actual economic damage is limited, a small deviation from the 
truth is already in breach of the commandment. In this paper we investigate if people take the size 
of the lie into account when they punish exploitive lies. 
A large philosophical literature discusses the morality of lying. Immanuel Kant or 
Augustine for example objected strongly to lying irrespective of its social and economic 
consequences
4 while others (e.g. Schopenhauer, Aristotle, see detailed discussions in Flier, 2007 
or Dietz, 2002) were more relaxed about lies, e.g. in the context of self-defense or compassion. 
Similarly, in law, punishment rules for deliberately false statements differ across policy fields 
and countries. Carbon emissions provide a policy example for punishment that does not reflect 
the size of a lie. In Australia, any deliberate misrepresentation of emissions is penalized 
irrespectively of its size.
5 One motive for implementing such a policy is that people “simply do 
not like being misled as such and that this triggers a taste for punishment” (Brandts and Charness, 
2003). One obvious counter-example is the punishment for tax evasion, see for example 
Allingham (1972) or Yitzhaki (1974). In most countries, the intensity of punishment depends on 
the size of the tax fraud, not just on the tax fraud itself. "[T]he level of punishment should (…) 
'fit' the crime" (Becker, 1968, as quoted in Slemrod, 2007, p.43). Becker’s comment brings about 
the belief that people differentiate between a small lie and a big lie. A big lie in this context 
implies a stronger deviation from the truth and inflicts more harm than a small lie. In 
consequence, any empirical analysis of lies, their size and their punishment has to address the 
crucial confound that people increase their punishment in the size of the lie because of the 
simultaneous increase in the economic harm. In a laboratory experiment we compare punishment 
for different sizes of lies controlling for the fact that lies of a different size also have different 
economic consequences. 
A great part of economic theory derives from the fact that people can use information 
asymmetry to maximize their gains. Misrepresentation of information (i.e., lying or deception) is 
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one way to do this. The issue of deception has attracted attention among economists in various 
circumstances, e.g. negotiations, consumer behavior, tax payments, accounting, politics, etc. (see 
e.g., Anton, 1993; Romer, 1996; Mazar et al., 2008; and Gino and Pierce, 2010).  
In consequence, experimental studies shed light on lying from different viewpoints. We 
divide this literature into two categories: studies on lying aversion and studies on liar aversion. 
Articles in the first category study incentives to lie and the disutility lying causes to the potential 
liar (i.e. lying aversion). Several studies show that the occurrence of lying depends on the 
outcome and that many people are lying averse, e.g. Gneezy (2005), Cai and Wang (2006), Sutter 
(2009), Rode (2010), Charness and Dufwenberg (2006), Lundquist et al. (2009), Sánchez-Pagés 
and Vorsatz (2007), Sánchez-Pagés and Vorsatz (2009), Kartik (2009), or Hurkens and Kartik 
(2009). Fischbacher and Heusi (2008) show that a significant share of people is lying averse. In 
their experiment lying is not harmful for a second party, but still 39% will not lie to increase their 
profits. Lundquist et al. (2009) find that lying aversion increases in the “size of the lie and 
strength of the promise”.  
The second category focuses on liar aversion, i.e. a disutility caused by being told a lie. 
Several studies have shown that people are liar averse and that lying increases punishment (see 
e.g. Brandts and Charness, 2003; Sánchez-Pagés and Vorsatz, 2007; Sánchez-Pagés and Vorsatz, 
2009, and Croson et al., 2003).  
Our paper contributes to both categories because, first, we analyze liar aversion. Thereby 
we differentiate between a general liar aversion and a special aversion to big liars. Second, we 
also consider lying aversion in order to distinguish liar aversion of liars and honest people. The 
novelty of our design is that we separate lying from its economic impact by comparing two 
treatments. In one treatment, a sender can impose economic harm on a receiver by choosing an 
unequal allocation. In the other treatment the choice of an unequal allocation necessarily requires 
an untruthful statement. In both treatments the computer randomly ignores an unequal allocation 
choice of the sender, and implements the equal split. Only in this case the receiver can punish the 
sender. Hence, the experimental design makes sure that inequity aversion cannot explain any 
subsequent punishment. The article of Brandts and Charness (2003) also falls into both 
categories. They analyze whether people exhibit a “consistent attitude” with respect to lying and 
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punishing lies. They find that honest people punish liars stronger than dishonest people do. This 
is why in our study we also distinguish between honest people’s and liar’s liar aversion. 
The first part of our results is in line with other studies. People are lying averse and liar 
averse. Additionally, we can show that the size of a lie matters. Liar aversion is increased by the 
degree of untruthfulness. In particular, it is the honest people who drive this behavioral pattern. 
Liars are not liar-averse and do also not react to the size of the lie. The following section presents 
the design of the experiment in detail. In Section 3 we describe predictions. Section 4 shows the 
results, and section 5 provides conclusions. 
2.  Experimental Design and Procedures 
In our experiment a player A can inflict economic harm on another person (player B). 
Player A receives an endowment of 20, 60, or 100 points. Player B receives no endowment. She 
also has no information about the actual size of Player A’s endowment but the distribution of 
endowments (see above) is common knowledge. Player A can divide her endowment into equal 
or unequal shares. If A receives 100 points she can transfer 10, 30, or 50 points to player B. If she 
receives 60 points, she can transfer 10 or 30 points to player B. If she receives 20 points, she has 
to transfer 10 points. In our analysis we are going to focus on subjects with an endowment of 
100, since they can choose between two different unequal allocations: (70,30) and (90,10). From 
now on we will label the allocation (70,30) as small inequality. A large inequality will describe 
the allocation (90,10). 
B learns A’s decision. After A’s decision a die determines whether B also learns about the 
size of A’s endowment. B’s chance to learn about the endowment is two out of three. If B does 
not learn about the actual size of the endowment, A’s decision is implemented. If B learns the 
actual endowment, the computer cancels A’s decision and automatically implements the equal 
split. After the computer implemented the equal distribution, and if A had transferred less than 
50% of the actual endowment, B can punish A by eliminating points from A’s account. One point 
of elimination costs B 0.2 points. B can eliminate all of A’s points but a negative payoff is 
impossible.  
In order to analyze responses to different size of lies, but also to control for the intended 
inequality, there are two different treatments. In Standard,  participants  play the game as 
described above. Depended on their endowment, player A can transfer 10, 30 or 50 points to 
player B. The second treatment (Lie) differs in only one respect: Player A has to lie to player B if   5
she chooses an unequal split. More specifically, A has to report the size of her endowment, and 
here lying is possible. Player A can communicate a pie size of 100, 60 or 20. If the actual size of 
the endowment is not revealed, player B receives 50% of the communicated endowment. Player 
A in turn keeps the remainder of the actual endowment. In case of revelation, both A and B 
receive 50% of the actual endowment, and B can punish A. This means, in both treatments we 
use the same splits: (50,50), (70,30), and (90,10). 
We conducted this experiment as a one-shot game with direct response method in which all 
subjects played both the roles of A and B. First, every player decided in the role of player A. In 
this role two subjects in each session received an endowment of 20 points. Two more received an 
endowment of 60 points and all other subjects an endowment of 100 points. Hence, player B 
could not immediately observe, if player A chose an unequal split or just received a smaller 
endowment. After their decision as player A, every player received the decision of another player 
A and decided as player B. A die decided ex-post if a subject received her payment for her 
decision in role A or in role B. By this means, the design allows us to distinguish liar’s liar 
aversion from honest people`s liar aversion. To avoid any potential direct reciprocity effect, 
participants were never matched twice, and were not informed about the final outcome of their 
decision as player A when they made their decision as player B. The whole procedure was 
common knowledge. We conducted 19 sessions in the time from June 2010 to April 2011 (with 
14-28 subjects each). All sessions were conducted at the LakeLab (TWI/University of Konstanz) 
with a total number of 854 participants. The experiment took about 35 minutes, one point 
translated into 0.20 Euro. Average income of participants was 8.76 Euro (11.52 US-$). The 
games were programmed with zTree by Fischbacher (2007). We recruited participants using the 
online recruiting system ORSEE by Greiner (2004). Each subject sat at a randomly assigned PC 
terminal and was given a copy of instructions.
6 A set of control questions was provided to ensure 
the understanding of the game. The experiment did not start until all subjects had answered all 
questions correctly. We ensured that no subject participated more than once in our experiment.  
3.  Behavioral Predictions 
In this section we discuss several motivations why and how people might punish in the two 
different treatments. Obviously, a rational selfish person would never punish because punishment 
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is costly for her and she cannot recoup any money. Theories that model non-selfish motives 
based on outcome-oriented preferences, such as Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) or Fehr and 
Schmidt (1999), also do not predict any punishment as punishment is only possible after 
revelation of the true endowment. Since in this case the computer always implements the equal 
distribution anyway, models of inequity aversion cannot explain the occurrence of punishment. 
Hypothesis 1 (Homo Economicus & Inequity Aversion): No punishment will occur. 
Falk and Fischbacher (2006), Levine (1998) and Rabin (1993) argue that people take the 
intentions of others into account. In our experiment a person who chooses an unequal allocation 
has unfair intentions. The intention to implement a small inequality is less unfriendly than the 
intention to implement a large inequality. If we assume that people take the fairness of the 
intended action into account, Hypothesis 2 follows. 
Hypothesis 2 (Intentions): Punishment for large inequalities will be higher than for small 
inequalities. 
The two treatments differ in the communication procedure. In Standard player A 
communicates the amount of points she wants to transfer to player B. In Lie player A 
communicates her initial endowment. If she does not want to share equally, she has to lie and 
communicate a false initial endowment. Intention-based models include the proposed distribution 
but not the way the proposal has been communicated. Hence, Hypothesis 2 postulates no 
differences between the treatments. Considerations of kindness (as in Falk and Fischbacher, 
2006) or altruism (as in Levine, 2003) focus on the interaction of deliberate decision making and 
economic outcomes. However, if people have a preference for truth telling punishment for lies 
should be higher than for communicated transfers. 
Hypothesis 3 (Liar Aversion): For any given unequal distribution, punishment in Lie will be 
higher than in Standard. 
Last but not least we look whether the size of a lie matters. Empirical support for hypothesis 3 
already provides a departure from established theoretical models of reciprocal behavior. The 
punishment of unfair intentions and of lies both reflect a response to a violation of social and/or 
moral norms. If fairness and truthfulness reflect a more general norm, perhaps ‘decency’, we   7
therefore expect an interaction between the punishment of unfair intentions and lying aversion. 
The use of a deliberately false statement amplifies the negative intentions behind the choice of an 
unfair allocation. 
Hypothesis 4 (Size of the Lie): People will increase punishment with the size of the inequality. 
They will react stronger to that increase in Lie than in Standard. 
In line with the results from Brandts and Charness (2003) we expect honest people and liars to 
show different behavioral patterns with respect to liar aversion and big-liar aversion. People who 
lie themselves are likely to attach less value to honesty as a social norm. This difference should 
have an impact on their punishment behavior.  
Hypothesis 5 (Heterogeneity in liar aversion): Honest people punish lies more strongly than liars. 
Our argument for hypothesis 4 rested on the assumption that fairness and honesty norms interact 
and coalesce into a more general social norm. If this positive interaction actually exists, dishonest 
people should worry less about unfair intentions than honest ones. 
Hypothesis 6 (Heterogeneity in big-liar aversion): Honest people react stronger to the size of a lie 
than liars.  
4.  Experimental Results 
In this section we are going to present the results of the experiment. First, we are going to 
evaluate player B’s liar aversion. Our measure is the deducted punishment points, i.e. the loss of 
player A due to punishment. Second, we are going to discuss player A’s transfer decision in order 
to classify people into liars and non-liars. Finally, we compare whether people’s own lying 
behavior affects their reaction to the experienced size of a lie. 
For the following analysis on liar aversion we focus on a subset of data. We measure lying 
aversion by punishment points assigned to player A by player B.
7 Punishment can only occur if – 
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after a choice of an unequal distribution – the random mechanism discloses the actual endowment 
and imposes the equal split. Thus, we focus on a subset of the available data. We analyze the 
situation in which player A received an endowment of 100 points, player A chose one of the two 
unequal splits, the actual endowment was revealed, and therefore both players received 50 points. 
For this case we can compare punishment for different size of lies. At the end of this section, for 
the analysis of heterogeneity of liar aversion, we will categorize people into liars and honest 
people. In order to do so, we can only include players who themselves were in a position to 
choose between a lie and being honest. For reasons of comparability we only use players with a 
pie size of 100. We use this subset of data for the whole data analysis.
8 Table 1 gives the number 
of observations.  
   Standard  Lie 
All observations    404  450 
Subset1  Player A:  
Pie 100  340 (84%)  378 (84%) 
Subset2   Player A:  
Pie 100, unequal split, disclosed   131 (32 %)  142 (32%) 
Subset3  Player A:  
Pie 100, unequal split, disclosed  
Player B: 
Pie 100   111 (27 %)  129 (29%) 
Table 1: Number of Observations (share of observations in treatment) 
Liar aversion 
How does punishment differ with respect to whether player A lied to achieve her goal? And 
does this punishment decision – reflecting liar aversion - differ with respect to the size of the lie? 
We will look at the punishment decision of player B who just learned that the original 
endowment is 100 and that player A did not intend to share the endowment equally. Since in this 
case the computer implemented the equal split, the outcome of player A and player B is the same 
(namely 50 each) and does not depend on the initial decision of player A. Figure 1 shows the 
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deducted punishment points from player A by player B. We consider 4 different cases: small and 
large inequality in Lie and small and large inequality in Standard. There is punishment in all 4 
cases. Obviously these results reject the first hypothesis (homo economicus and inequity 
aversion) since punishment occurred although the equal split was implemented.  
We can also reject Hypotheses 2 since, at least in Standard, punishment is not aligned with 
the intended unfriendliness. Punishment for trying to implement a large inequality is 5.03 
(standard deviation 11.88), whereas punishment for an intended small inequality is 6.09 (11.25). 
This difference is not significant. 
 
Figure 1: Deducted punishment points of  player A by player B, Subset3 
However, the data confirms Hypotheses 3. We find that punishment in Lie is significantly 
higher than in Standard in both situations. For a small inequality punishment is 6.09 in Standard 
compared to 9.71 in Lie (Wilcoxon ranksum test, p<0.05). Punishment for a large inequality is 
5.03 in Standard. With 16.30 in Lie it is more than three times as high (Wilcoxon ranksum test, 
p<0.01). Hence, lies are punished significantly stronger than intended inequalities alone. People 
not only punish the actual unfair intention but also the lie. The first regression in Table 2 
reinforces the result. The interaction term in the second regression of Table 2 validates that the 
size of a lie significantly affects people’s punishment decision. People not only punish lies per se 
but are also sensitive to the size of the lie. This supports Hypothesis 4.    10
 (1)  (2) 
    
Lie treatment  8.034***  3.627 
 (1.779)  (2.347) 
Large inequality  3.075*  -1.056 
 (1.771)  (2.216) 
Lie×Large   7.643** 
   (3.451) 
Constant 3.668**  6.087*** 
 (1.505)  (1.654) 
Observations 240  240 
R-squared 0.086  0.103 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 2: Regression with Subset3, dependent variable deducted punishment points from 
player A, robust standard errors 
Brandts and Charness (2003) show that honest people and liars differ in their response 
towards a lie. They find that honest people punish liars stronger than dishonest people do. We are 
interested in whether liars and honest people also differ in their response to big lies vs. small lies. 
The feature of our design is that we can easily analyze individual relations between lying – and 
liar aversion. Hence, we turn to people’s lying behavior.  
Lying aversion and liar aversion 
In Standard 37% of players A with an endowment of 100 choose to share the pie equally. 
In Lie, where not choosing the equal share implies telling a lie, people are slightly friendlier. 
Here, 46% of participants choose to share the pie equally. We find that more people abstain from 
choosing unequal distributions if this requires lying (Wilcoxon ranksum, p=0.02). This result is in 
line with previous studies that show that people have a preference for telling the truth, such as 
Hurkens and Kartik (2009), Charness and Dufwenberg (2006), Lundquist et al. (2009), Sánchez-
Pagés and Vorsatz (2007), or Sánchez-Pagés and Vorsatz (2009).    11
   
Figure 2: Lie: Deducted punishment points 
from player A by player B, Subset3 
Figure 3: Standard: Deducted punishment 
points from player A by player B, Subset3 
Participants in Lie could therefore be categorized into honest people and liars. Honest 
players are players who did not lie when they were player A, and therefore chose the equal split. 
Liars lied in order to choose one of the unequal splits. Figure 2 uses these two categories and 
distinguishes punishment by honest players from punishment by liars. Naturally, for Standard, 
Figure 3 differentiates between fair and selfish players.
9 
Figure 2 confirms Hypotheses 5 and 6. It shows that liars punish only a very small amount 
anyway and are not sensitive to the size of the lie (Wilcoxon ranksum, p=0.39). In contrast to 
liars` behavior, punishment by honest people is significantly higher for small inequalities 
(Wilcoxon ranksum, p<0.01) and also for large inequalities (Wilcoxon ranksum, p<0.01). Honest 
people react strongly to the size of a lie and punish large inequalities more than small ones 
(Wilcoxon ranksum, p<0.01). As the regressions 1 and 2 in Table 3 confirm, honest people 
(Variable IamLiar = 0) react stronger to the size of a lie than liars do (Variable IamLiar = 1). We 
conclude that the behaviour of the honest population explains the main effect of aversion against 
big lies.  
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VARIABLES (1)  (2) 
    
IamLiar -18.28***  -11.66*** 
 (2.204)  (3.137) 
Large inequality  5.308**  11.22*** 
 (2.192)  (4.014) 
IamLiar×Large   -11.69*** 
   (4.299) 
Constant 19.51***  15.96*** 
 (2.334)  (2.976) 
    
Observations 129  129 
R-squared 0.377  0.411 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 3: Regression with Subset3, Lie only dependent variable: deducted punishment points 
from player A by player B, robust standard errors 
We do not find these effects in Standard. Here, punishment behavior of fair and selfish people 
does not differ. Neither fair nor selfish people react to the size of the inequality (Wilcoxon 
ranksum, p=0.50 and p=0.17). However, for intended large inequalities, fair people punish more 
strongly than unfair people do (Wilcoxon ranksum, p<0.01). This result is in line with Kahneman 
et al. (1986) who also find that people punish selfish choosers more often if they had not 
themselves been selfish choosers. 
5.  Conclusion 
In a laboratory experiment we analyzed the impact of large and small lies per se, i.e. 
controlling for the resulting economic damage. Apart from a general liar aversion, we find that 
people are sensitive to the size of a lie. We also observe that a person’s own attitude towards 
lying has a strong impact on punishment. Lying-averse people are also liar-averse. They 
additionally have a strong aversion to big lies. Dishonest people are soft punishers in any context.  
The punishment of a lie is not just induced by a morale that is categorically against lying in 
any case (e.g. the Ten Commandments or the Kantian doctrine of virtue). The punishers seem to 
consider truth-telling as a valuable social norm. The punishment of big lies aims particularly at 
upholding this social norm. Theories of social preferences should therefore take into account that 
preferences for honesty shape negative reciprocity especially if people make gross misstatements 
about the truth.   13
6.  Appendix – Instructions (Standard) 
Welcome to this economic experiment. 
Your decisions and possibly the decisions of the other participants in this experiment will 
influence your payoff. Therefore, it is important that you read these instructions carefully. 
Throughout the entire experiment, it is not permitted to communicate with other 
participants. Therefore, we ask you not to speak with one another. If you do not understand 
something, please take another look at the instructions. If you still have any questions, please 
raise your hand. We will then come to you and answer your question personally. During the 
experiment, we will not speak of Euros, but of points. Thus, your total income will initially be 
calculated in points. The total sum of points that you will have achieved at the end of this 
experiment will be converted into euros, where 1 point = 20 cents. On the following pages, we 
will explain the exact procedure of the experiment. Every participant will receive the same 
instructions. 
The Experiment 
In this experiment, every participant fulfills two roles: every participant makes a decision in the 
role of participant A as well as in the role of participant B. At the end of the experiment, it will be 
randomly decided whether the decisions you made in role A or the ones you made in role B will 
be relevant for your payoff. 
Procedure 
Participant A receives between 20 and 100 points. Participant A then informs participant B how 
many points she will give to him. Example: A receives 100 points. She informs B that she will 
give 30 points to B. So A keeps 70 points for himself. But in 2/3 of the cases, participant B finds 
out the number of points that A has received. In this case mentioned here, B receives half of the 
points that A has received. If A does not spontaneously decide to give away half of the points that 
she has received, then B can eliminate some of A’s points. This aspect will be explained in more 
detail shortly. If participant B does NOT find out the number of points that A has really received, 
she will only receive the points that she has obtained by A. In this case, B cannot cross out points 
from A. Example: A receives 60 points. She informs B that she will give 10 of her points to him. 
If B finds out that A has received 60 points, B’s points will increase to 30. A’s points will 
decrease to 30. Furthermore, B can cross out points that belong to participant A. The deduction of 
points works as follows: B specifies how many of A’s points she wants to cross out. These points   14
will be deducted from A’s amount and will expire. In doing so, you cannot cross out more points 
than the amount of points that A already has. A negative number of points is not possible. 
However, the deduction of A’s points entails costs for B. These costs consist of 20% of A’s 
crossed-out points. If B has crossed out 15 of A’s points, the number of B’s points will decrease 
by 3 points. After all possible deductions have been carried out, all final decisions will have been 
made and it will be randomly decided which participant takes on role A or role B. 
Procedure on the Computer 
At first, everyone will make their decisions as participant A. You will be informed whether you 
have received 20, 60 or 100 points. The actual distribution works as follows: two participants in 
this experiment will receive 20 points each and two other people will receive 60 points each. The 
rest of the participants will receive 100 points each. Now you can decide how many points you 
would like to give away to participant B.  
•  If you have received 100 points, you can transfer one of the following to B: 50 points, 30 
points, 10 points.  
•  If you have received 60 points, you can transfer one of the following to B: 30 points, 10 
points.  
•  If you have received 20 points, you can transfer the following sum to B:   
10 points.  
Then, as participant B, you will find out which amount has been transferred to you by participant 
A. Bear in mind: the person who receives a transfer from you (you being participant A) will not 
be the same person who transfers a sum of points to you (you being participant B)! Afterwards, 
participant 1 randomly decides whether the number of points that A actually receives will be 
revealed to you, participant B. You will find out on the computer screen how this exactly works. 
If this number is not revealed to you, the number of points you already have will remain 
unchanged. If the number of points is revealed to you and A has transferred half of these points to 
you, your number of points will also remain unchanged. If the number of points is revealed and A 
has transferred less than half of these points to you, your number of points will change. In this 
case, participants A and B will both receive 50% of the revealed number of points. Furthermore, 
participant B can cross out points that belong to participant A. You just have to type in the 
amount of points that you want crossed out in the dialogue box on the screen. However, the 
deduction of A’s points is entailed with costs for B. These costs consist of 20% of A’s crossed-  15
out points. Finally, it will be randomly decided whether your decision as participant A or your 
decision as participant B will be relevant for your payoff. You will find out on the computer 
screen how this exactly works. 
 
7.  Appendix – Instructions (Lie) 
Welcome to this economic experiment. 
Your decisions and possibly the decisions of the other participants in this experiment will 
influence your payoff. Therefore, it is important that you read these instructions carefully. 
Throughout the entire experiment, it is not permitted to communicate with other 
participants. Therefore, we ask you not to speak with one another. If you do not understand 
something, please take another look at the instructions. If you still have any questions, please 
raise your hand. We will then come to you and answer your question personally. During the 
experiment, we will not speak of Euros, but of points. Thus, your total income will initially be 
calculated in points. The total sum of points that you will have achieved at the end of this 
experiment will be converted into euros, where 1 point = 20 cents. On the following pages, we 
will explain the exact procedure of the experiment. Every participant will receive the same 
instructions. 
The Experiment 
In this experiment, every participant fulfills two roles: every participant makes a decision in the 
role of participant A as well as in the role of participant B. At the end of the experiment, it will be 
randomly decided whether the decisions you made in role A or the ones you made in role B will 
be relevant for your payoff. 
Procedure 
Participant A receives between 20 and 100 points. Participant A then informs participant B how 
many points she has received. A has to give half of her ANNOUNCED points to B. A can also lie 
to B by telling him that she has received fewer points. In this case, A automatically gives 50% of 
her announced points to B and keeps the rest of her points. After that, B finds out the amount of 
points that A wants to inform him about. Example: A receives 100 points. She informs B that she 
has received 60 points. B receives half of the 60 points. So A gives 30 points to B and keeps 70 
points for himself.   16
Afterwards, it is randomly decided whether participant B should find out the real amount of 
points that A has received. The computer screen will show you how this procedure exactly 
works. In 2/3 of the cases, participant B finds out the real number of points that A has received. 
In this case mentioned here, B receives half of the real number of points that A has received. If A 
does not tell him the correct number of points that she has received, then B can cross out some of 
A’s points. This aspect will be explained in more detail shortly. If participant B does NOT find 
out the number of points that A has really received, she will only receive half of the points that 
she has been informed about. In this case, B cannot cross out points from A. Example: A receives 
60 points. She informs B that she has received 20 points. Thus, she gives 10 of her points to B 
and keeps 50 points for himself. If B finds out that A has actually received 60 points, B’s points 
will increase to 30. A’s points will decrease to 30. Furthermore, B can cross out points that 
belong to participant A. The deduction of points works as follows: B specifies how many of A’s 
points she wants to cross out. These points will be deducted from A’s amount and will expire. In 
doing so, you cannot cross out more points than the amount of points that A already has. A 
negative number of points is not possible. However, the deduction of A’s points entails costs for 
B. These costs consist of 20% of A’s crossed-out points. If B has crossed out 15 points from A, 
the number of points for B will decrease by 3 points. After all possible deductions have been 
carried out, all final decisions will have been made and participant 1 will randomly decide which 
participant takes on role A or role B. You can find out on the computer screen how this exactly 
works. 
Procedure on the Computer 
At first, everyone will make their decisions as participant A. You will be informed whether you 
have received 20, 60 or 100 points. The actual distribution works as follows: two participants in 
this experiment will receive 20 points each and two other people will receive 60 points each. The 
rest of the participants will receive 100 points each. Now you can decide to tell B which number 
of points you have received.  
•  If you have received 100 points, you can tell B one of the following numbers: 100 points, 
60 points, 20 points.  
•  If you have received 60 points, you can tell B one of the following numbers: 60 points, 20 
points.    17
•  If you have received 20 points, you can tell B the following number:   
20 points.  
Then, as participant B, you will find out which number of points A has received. You will also 
find out how many points you will receive (50% of the announced points). Bear in mind: the 
person who receives your statement (you being participant A) will not be the same person who 
tells you her statement (you being participant B)! Afterwards, it will be randomly decided 
whether the number of points that A actually receives will be revealed to you, participant B. If 
this number is not revealed to you, the number of points you already have will remain unchanged. 
If the number of points is revealed to you and the number corresponds to A’s specified amount, 
your number of points will also remain unchanged. If the number of points is revealed and is 
larger than A’s specified amount of points, your number of points will change. In this case, 
participants A and B will both receive 50% of the revealed number of points. Furthermore, 
participant B can cross out points that belong to participant A. You just have to type in the 
number of points that you want crossed out in the dialogue box on the screen. However, the 
deduction of A’s points entails costs for B. These costs consist of 20% of A’s crossed-out points. 
Finally, it will be randomly decided whether your decision as participant A or your decision as 
participant B will be relevant for your payoff. 
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